Criminal Law--Involuntary Manslaughter--Death from Fright by House, Luther
Kentucky Law Journal






Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
House, Luther (1955) "Criminal Law--Involuntary Manslaughter--Death from Fright," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 43 : Iss. 4 , Article 9.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol43/iss4/9
Recent Cases
CRdvINAL LAW-INvOLUNTAkY MANSLAUGHTER-DEATH FROM FIGiHT--
Defendant was indicted for involuntary manslaughter arising out of
the death of a forty-three year old woman who was afflicted with high
blood pressure. The death occurred as a result of a cerebral hemor-
rhage which she suffered after the defendant, in a drunken and an
inordinate manner, entered her house without invitation, and caused
a general disturbance by loud and profane language. He left the
house upon request, but later he returned and beat and banged the
windows of deceased's room. Such conduct greatly excited and nau-
seated the deceased until she was forced to retire to bed, where,
within a few minutes, she lapsed into unconsciousness and died in
three days. An attending physician stated that Mrs. Brown's hemor-
rhage was a direct result of defendant's conduct, while the family
doctor stated that he could not be sure of the cause. From conviction
in the circuit court, defendant appealed. Held: Conviction reversed.
The court recognized that criminal liability may be imposed for death
caused by fright, even though no hostile demonstration or overt act
was directed at the person of the deceased; however, the act causing
fright must be the proximate cause of death. Graves v. Common-
wealth, 273 S.W. 2d 380 (Ky. 1954).
The court found and scrutinized only two issues in the instant
case. The first issue involved the problem of criminal liability being
imposed for a death resulting from fright without corporeal injury.
The second issue was whether or not the defendant's conduct was
the proximate cause of Mrs. Brown's death. The court, citing several
Kentucky cases,' found that Kentucky accepts the modem view that
criminal responsibility may be incurred where an act of the accused
is the proximate cause of death resulting from fright or fear.2 How-
ever, in this case, as in previous decisions, no causal relation was
found to exist between the acts of the defendant and the death. The
Court of Appeals, quoting Hubbard v. Commonwealth,3 said, "It is,
'Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 818, 202 S.W. 2d 634 (1947); Com-
monwealth v. Couch, 32 K.L.R. 638, 106 S.W. 830 (1910); Hendrickson v. Com-
monwealth, 85 Ky. 281, 8 S.W. 166 (1887).2 Contra, see 26 Am. Jir. 129, sec. 47 which lists Kentucky as adhering
closely to the old common law rule requiring corporeal injury as a basis for
criminal responsibility. This is a misinterpretation of Kentucky cases which is
probably due to Kentucky's conservatism in finding the existence of proximate
cause in mental distress cases. ' Supra, note 1.
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at least, speculative to say that the act of the defendant in this case
was sufficiently proximate to impose criminal responsibility upon him
for the unfortunate death."
The early common law rule held that the cause of death must be
corporeal, and not nervous or emotional, in order for criminal homicide
to be established. 4 The modem trend in the United States is to find
liability for death caused from fright, if such death is the proximate
result of the act causing the fright. This trend is led by In Re Heigho,5
which held that death caused from fright, grief, terror or nervous
shock could be made the basis for criminal prosecution.
The Kentucky court, while recognizing the modem view, has been
very conservative in finding the existence of proximate cause in a case
of the Graves type. It is evident that the court must have an extremely
clear instance of a causal relation before it will sustain a conviction
for death from fright.
An examination of the principles of the instant case must involve
two significant factors, i.e., the nature of the act and the causal con-
nection between the act and the death.
The first factor in this analysis, the nature of the act, has been an
essential consideration by courts in cases of unintentional homicide.
The old view, still held by many jurisdictions, was that an unintended
death occurring during the course of an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony, was involuntary manslaughter.6  The more widely ac-
cepted view, and the better one, is that the act must be dangerous in
itself for liability in negligent homicides. 7 The languages of past Ken-
tucky decisions seems to indicate that Kentucky follows the common
law rule that the act need only be unlawful.8 However, in each of the
Kentucky cases that apply the unlawful act doctrine, the facts are
such that a conviction based on the dangerousness of the act could
also have been sustained.9 It is believed that the present Kentucky
court would, therefore, require the act to be dangerous for unin-
tentional homicides. Whether such is the law in Kentucky may be in
some doubt, but there can be no question that the court should re-
quire the act to be dangerous in itself. However, the court in the
'Regina v. Towers, 12 Cox C. C. 530 (1874); Regina v .Murton, 3 Fost. &
F. 221 (1862); 2 Bunnic, LAw OF Camms 97 (1946); 1 EAST P. C. 225 (1803);
1 HALE P. C. 429 (1778); 26 Am. Jun. 190 (1940).
'18 Idaho 566, 110 Pac. 1029 (1910). 6Niote, 39 Ky. L. J. 346 (1951).
"Regina v. Franklin, 15 Cox C.C. 163 (1883); Moreland, A SUGGESTED
HoMIcmE STATUTE FOR KENTrucxy, 41 Ky. L.J. 139, 166 (1953).8 Middleton v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 784, 202 S.W. 2d 610 (1947); Com-
monwealth v. Owens, 198 Ky. 655, 249 S.W. 792 (1923); Note, 41 Ky. L.J. 94(1952). 'Note, 41 Ky. L.J. 94, 96, 98 (1952).
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instant case scarcely considered the nature of the act.10 Consideration
of this point would not have changed its ultimate decision, but such
examination would have permitted the court to avoid the troublesome
question of proximate cause. It is clear that the defendant's actions
amounted to a breach of the peace and were therefore unlawful, but
it is believed that such acts were not criminally dangerous in them-
selves. Cursing and shouting in a person's home and even beating
upon the outside are certainly reprehensible, but they should not be
considered such dangerous acts as to constitute the degree of danger
requisite for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, i.e., as to con-
stitute reckless disregard of human life and safety. By following the
better'rule, the court could have reversed the conviction at this point
and would have needed to'go no further.
However, the court's decision turned on the second factor of the
analysis discussed herein, i.e., the issue of a causal relationship. The
question of proximate cause should be left to the jury if reasonable
men could disagree as to the causal connection.'1 It is quite evident
that reasonable men, not only could disagree in this instance, but did
disagree on the point of a causal relationship. One doctor testified
that Mrs. Brown's hemorrhage ". . . was a direct result of the conduct
.".,12 of the defendant, while another testified that he could not state
that the death was a direct result of the defendant's acts. In fact, a
good argument could be made that the death in the instant case was
the proximate result of defendant's acts, as there was no intervening
cause between the acts and the death.'3 Thus, in a discussion of a
case of this type, it has been said, "There being no intervening cause
in such a case, the defendant's act may well be considered the direct
cause of death."' 4 The woman's heart attack may have been unfore-
' It is possible that the court had no opportunity to examine this point, since
the defendant failed to raise this issue in the court below. The Appelate Court
may not review any error which was not raised below, unless such error was afundamental error. Whether failure to raise this point was a fundamental error,
would depend upon the Court of Appeals acceptance of the dangerous act doctrine.
If the court accepts such a doctrine, then the error would be fundamental and
therefore the court would have had the power to review the nature of the act.
'Murphy v. Homans, 286 Ky. 191, 150 S.W. 2d 14 (1940); O'Neil & Hearne
v. Bray's Adm'x, 262 Ky. 377, 90 S.W. 2d 353 (1936); Kentucky Traction &
Terminal Co. v. Brawner, 208 Ky. 310, 270 S.W. 825 (1925); Besser v. Cincin-
nati, N.O.T.P. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 522, 153 S.W. 742 (1913).
12273 S.W. 2d 380, 381 (Ky. 1954).
' In two previous decisions in Kentucky in this type of case, the court could
find an intervening act or force which broke the chain of causal relation. Hubbard
v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 818, 202 S.W. 2d 634 (1947); Com. v. Couch, 32
K.L.R. 638, 106 S.W. 830 (1910).
" Focht, Proximate Cause in the Law of Homicide With Special Reference
to California Cases, 12 So. CALiF. L. REv. 19, 47 (1938), in speaking of In Re
Heigho, supra note 5.
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seeable as a result of the defendant's acts, but foreseeability is not
always required in proximate cause.15 Hence, it is plausible that a
causal relation did exist.
Other jurisdictions have refused to take the question of proximate
cause from the jury when reasonable men would differ in their in-
terpretation of the causal facts,16 and it is submitted that this is the
action that the Kentucky Court of Appeals should have taken. The
appellate court should not have reversed the lower court on the basis
of proximate cause because the facts of the instant case did not con-
stitute such a clear lack of a causal relation that the upper court
could say as a matter of law there was no proximate cause.
There are two conclusions to be established from the foregoing
analysis of the Graves case in light of the modem view that criminal
responsibility may be imposed for causing death by fright. First, the
court should have placed more emphasis (if procedurally possible)1'
on the nature of the defendant's act. By finding the act not to be
dangerous, the court could have reached the same result and could
have avoided the vexing problem of proximate cause. Second, since
the court did review the causal aspect of the case, it should not have
ruled as a matter of law that there was no causal connection between
the act and the death. Such a problem was for the jury, and the
finding of the circuit court on the issue of proximate cause should not
have been disturbed.
The court's ultimate decision seems to be correct, but its analysis
seems questionable since the case should have turned on the nature
of the act rather than the causal relationship.
LUTHR HousE
Co,_.r OF LAws-LnrrrAnoN OF AcroNs-"Bomown G" STATUTE-
Plaintiff, a resident of New Jersey, brought an action against de-
fendant Kentucky corporation in a United States District Court in
Kentucky, for recovery of damages for personal injuries arising out
of an accident that occurred in New Jersey on March 14, 1952. The
Kentucky statute of limitation for personal injuries is one year, whereas
in New Jersey the period is two years. Complaint was filed on March
13, 1954. The court overruled defendant's motion to dismiss the
action, based on the Kentucky statute of limitations, and in accord
with past Kentucky decisions, held that the Kentucky "borrowing"
RESTATEMENT, ToRTS, sec. 485 (1934); PRossER, TORTS, see. 48 (1941).
x In Re Heigho, supra note 5.
'7 Supra note 10.
